Beyond Truth‐Telling: A Replication Study on School Choice
Abstract
ABSTRACT In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non‐truth‐telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth‐telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 45 of the 57 investigated data sets ( value threshold 0.05).
Fields of Study & Subjects
School Choice and Performance
Global Educational Reforms and Inequalities
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Journal of Applied Econometrics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 323–329
- Publication date
- 8 January 2026
- Language
- EN