On the complexity of the two-stage majoritarian rule

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Authors: Yongjie Yang
Cited by: 0
References: 64

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Abstract

Abstract Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, (Horan and Sprumont, Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 521–537 2022) proposed a sequential rule named two-stage majoritarian rule (TSMR). This paper examines this rule by investigating the complexity of Agenda Control , Coalition Manipulation , Possible Winner , Necessary Winner , and eight standard election control problems. Our study offers a comprehensive insight into the complexity landscape of these problems.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Game Theory and Voting Systems Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting Advanced Graph Theory Research

Publication details

Journal / source
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Volume
40
Issue
1
Publication date
27 March 2026
Language
EN