On the complexity of the two-stage majoritarian rule
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Abstract Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, (Horan and Sprumont, Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 521–537 2022) proposed a sequential rule named two-stage majoritarian rule (TSMR). This paper examines this rule by investigating the complexity of Agenda Control , Coalition Manipulation , Possible Winner , Necessary Winner , and eight standard election control problems. Our study offers a comprehensive insight into the complexity landscape of these problems.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Advanced Graph Theory Research
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 1
- Publication date
- 27 March 2026
- Language
- EN