Metaethical Contextualism, Triviality and Semantic Blindness
Abstract
This paper answers an objection to metaethical contextualism. Contextualism is the view that moral claims involve reference to standards or ends determined by context. The problem is that contextualism entails that certain moral claims are trivially true, which is contrary to appearances. I develop an account of semantic competence with moral terms that explains why it is not obvious to speakers that moral claims are indexed to standards or ends. This masks the trivial nature of the relevant moral claims.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Aesthetics
and Art
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Erkenntnis
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3585–3602
- Publication date
- 20 January 2026
- Language
- EN