Metaphysical Infinitism and Theoretical Virtue

Abstract Call metaphysicians who think that chains of ontological dependence must terminate in a collection of fundamental entities foundationalists . Call metaphysicians who think that chains of being can proceed ad infinitum infinitists . Foundationalists claim that foundationalism displays certain theoretical advantages over infinitism. First, some maintain that infinitism has a special explanatory problem that foundationalism doesn’t. Second, others maintain that foundationalism exhibits greater theoretical unity than infinitism. I argue that these considerations give us no reason to prefer foundationalism to infinitism. Against the foundationalist’s first purported advantage, I argue that foundationalists must make theoretical concessions similar to those infinitists must make (Sect. 1). And against the foundationalist’s second purported advantage – an advantage infinitists haven’t yet addressed – I argue that infinitism exhibits a different, but nevertheless attractive, kind of theoretical virtue; namely, infinitists explain all existence facts in similar ways (Sect. 2). I conclude that foundationalism and infinitism are, at worst, on a theoretical par (Sect. 3).