The Deliberative Significance of Moral Obligations
Abstract
Abstract Moral obligations are often seen as deliberatively significant in a way that differs from the role that ordinary reasons play in our practical deliberations about what we ought to do. R. Jay Wallace claims that his relational approach to morality is well-suited to make this feature intelligible, while other approaches fail. Against this, I argue that rationalists who trace obligations back to reasons have the means either to explain the deliberative significance of moral obligations or to reject it as illusory, and that the relational approach can be criticised as both extensionally inadequate and explanatorily unsatisfactory.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 193–210
- Publication date
- 15 January 2026
- Language
- EN