Liberty, Equality, Animality: On Freedom and Nonhuman Agency

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Authors: Dayton Martindale
Cited by: 0
References: 37

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Abstract

Animal ethicists disagree as to whether animals have an interest in liberty, or control over their own lives. In one perspective, most nonhuman animals have no such interest, as they are not autonomous persons who frame, revise, and pursue their own conception of the good. If true, there is nothing wrong with their confinement, ownership, or use so long as this does not result in suffering or death. After first explaining this view, I will show that it is unconvincing. Drawing on the ethological literature, I suggest instead that the free exercise of agency, or self-willed action, is important to animal well-being, thus grounding a strong interest in liberty—one that, whether instrumental or intrinsic, is fundamental and pervasive. Finally, I argue that respecting animal liberty requires more than releasing them from the most obvious forms of captivity, but requires significant social transformation on at least three levels: the interpersonal, the infrastructural, and the institutional.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Animal Law and Welfare Philosophical Ethics and Theory Environmental Philosophy and Ethics

Publication details

Journal / source
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics
Volume
39
Issue
2
Publication date
30 March 2026
Language
EN