Defining Moral Injury: A Natural Scaffold

The concept of moral injury (MI), while increasingly referenced across disciplines, remains under-theorised philosophically, with current definitions often relying on subjective intuitions of "what is right." This paper addresses a critical gap by interrogating the ethical foundations of MI and proposing a normative framework that resists conceptual drift. Drawing on natural law theory with its roots in natural justice, I argue that the developing construct requires grounding in principles of intelligibility, universality, and objectivity-all criteria essential for any robust ethical theory. Through a systematic conceptual analysis, I delineate the dynamic interplay between ethics, moral conscience, and behaviour, demonstrating how natural law thinking can safeguard the construct from moral relativism and ideological annexation. This approach not only strengthens definitional clarity but also enhances interdisciplinary applicability, offering a philosophically rigorous foundation for future research and practice. By anchoring MI within an enduring ethical tradition, the paper advances its theoretical development and positions it as a concept of significant interdisciplinary and societal relevance.