The exceptionality of enactivism within 4E cognition

Abstract This article critically examines the theoretical landscape of 4E cognition—embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition—to assess whether it constitutes a true departure from the traditional framework in the cognitive sciences grounded in computationalism, representationalism, functionalism, internalism, and realism. While many proponents of 4E cognition claim to defend such a radical shift, I argue that only a specific strain of enactive cognition—autopoietic or autonomist enactivism—genuinely challenges all core tenets of mainstream cognitive science. Drawing on the causation-constitution dichotomy and the literature on weak versus strong variants of embodied and extended cognition, I show that most E-theories can be assimilated into the cognitivist framework when suitably qualified. By contrast, autopoietic enactivism, with its roots in second-order cybernetics and autopoietic theory, demands a deeper reconceptualization of cognition as emergent from dynamic, embodied interaction rather than internal symbol manipulation. It resists realist commitments to cognitive posits and leans toward radical constructivism, presenting a comprehensive reconceptualization of the field rather than mere theoretical elaboration. Thus, I conclude that the enactive approach remains the only strand within 4E cognition where a full rejection of the foundational assumptions of traditional cognitive science is possible.