Towards an inferentialist account of essentialist explanation
Abstract
Abstract The fact that it is essential that p in some sense explains that p . This paper makes one negative and one positive contribution. Negatively, the paper argues that the sense of explanation is not ground , and we prove—contra Vogt—that the issue has nothing to do with whether one works with a representational or worldly notion of ground. Positively, the paper proposes an inferentialist account of essence and uses that to develop an account of essentialist explanation.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and History of Science
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Philosophical Studies
- Volume
- 183
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1601–1623
- Publication date
- 27 January 2026
- Language
- EN