Causal Argument, Causal Theory of Hallucinations, and intrinsic properties

Abstract Naïve Realism is well-regarded for its explanatory advantages over competing theories of perception. However, it faces serious challenges, particularly from the “Causal” or “Screening off” Argument. This paper critically examines a recent response to this argument, termed the “Causal Theory of Hallucinations” (CTH), which posits that one of the fundamental features of hallucinations is their causation through deviant means. After discussing the core assumptions of the Causal Argument, along with orthodox responses and their limitations, I introduce non-orthodox strategies, which deny Local Supervenience to offer a fresh perspective. This paper analyzes key premises behind this non-orthodox approach, particularly the traditional Causal Theory of Perceptions and the claim that being perceptual is a fundamental property of perceptions. For the former, a counterexample challenges the central claim that “perception” is a causal concept; for the latter, I question, among other aspects, the move from modal necessity to fundamentality regarding the perceptual property. The analysis culminates in a revised version of the Causal Argument and a modified “Local Supervenience” principle that upholds original intuitions. The argument proved damaging because CTH, treating causation as an extrinsic property of events, lacks the resources to counter the local supervenience of intrinsic aspects of hallucinations. As a result, CTH cannot prevent intrinsic properties of hallucinations from spreading to perceptions, leading to the explanatory overdetermination of it, as a non-orthodox strategy, originally seeks to avoid. Finally, I suggest alternatives to CTH that may more effectively address these issues, although they face distinctive justificational issues as well as distinctive associated challenges.