Cooperation and coordination in egalitarian political economies

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Authors: Doğuhan Sündal
Cited by: 0
References: 46

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Abstract

Abstract Incentive structures that support desired outcomes are crucial for building an egalitarian system. However, existing theories explicitly accounting for the social interactions that shape these structures are scarce. Thus, this study examines three types of political economies in which individual decisions depend on the actions of others and their consequences. Using simulations and mean-field solutions, it analyzes labor supply, occupational choice, and production decisions within these systems to explore the role of price signals, redistributive schemes and social interactions in achieving desirable equilibrium outcomes. JEL Classification: B51; C63; C72; D91; P21.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Economic Theory and Institutions Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Publication details

Journal / source
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
Volume
21
Issue
3
Pages
581–597
Publication date
26 March 2026
Language
EN