Institutionalised Commitment and Its Origins
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Schelling (1960) and Frank (1988) famously offered commitment as an explanation of the stability of human cooperation in the face of incentives to cheat. Reputationally-enforced commitments were part of the explanation for human cooperation for much of our history (Khan, 2024, 2025). In this article, I consider the origins and effects of institutionalised commitments. These are commitments which are contractually enforced by third parties, rather than only reputationally enforced. I discuss how these commitment offer advantages for securing cooperation over and above our previous forms of commitment. I then offer an account of their potential origins. I suggest that a change in our cooperative landscape and organisational structure occurring in the Neolithic -- in particular, the rise of agricultural economies and hierarchical society -- opened the door to a new means of enforcement for commitments, affecting the success of our cooperative practices.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Economic Theory and Institutions
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Human Nature
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 77–103
- Publication date
- 1 March 2026
- Language
- EN