Neutral But Better: The Possibility of Null Hierarchies
Abstract
Abstract Can two items both be neutral in value yet differ in rank? I argue that they can, with significant implications: not everything neutral should be treated equally. This challenges the widespread assumption that neutral value marks a point of evaluative equivalence. I defend the intuitive case for neutral hierarchies through examples from aesthetics and welfare, then show that both major accounts of neutral value—comparative and non-comparative—can accommodate such hierarchies once divorced from certain theoretical commitments.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Ethics
Aesthetics
and Art
Embodied and Extended Cognition
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Acta Analytica
- Publisher
- Springer Science and Business Media LLC
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 735–750
- Publication date
- 12 February 2026
- Language
- EN