In-Orbit Validation of a Heterogeneous COTS Architecture for Onboard AI: System-Level Operational Vulnerabilities and Failure Pathways

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Authors: Dongshik Won, Kyungwoo Hong, Dongwoo Lee, Heoncheol Lee, Hyochoong Bang
Cited by: 1
References: 28

Abstract

Abstract The adoption of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) processors for in-orbit AI is limited by operational reliability risks with limited in-orbit data. This paper reports an in-orbit validation of a heterogeneous architecture combining a Microchip PolarFire SoC and an NVIDIA Jetson Orin NX. In this on-orbit dataset, many observed faults stem from system integration and operational protocol-driven degradation rather than from isolated radiation events. The PolarFire-based system instability aligned with a fragile I/O boot chain at the storage interface rather than the SoC silicon. The Jetson-based system exhibited an end-of-life cascade consistent with cumulative storage degradation under repeated abrupt power cycles. In this paper, the term vulnerability refers to operational reliability failure modes rather than cyber-security exploits. This paper does not assess cyber-security vulnerabilities in open-source or COTS software. The results support a heterogeneous architecture where a resilient Supervisory Node manages recovery actions for a high-performance accelerator.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Radiation Effects in Electronics Distributed systems and fault tolerance Real-Time Systems Scheduling

Publication details

Journal / source
International Journal of Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Volume
27
Issue
4
Pages
3642–3659
Publication date
24 February 2026
Language
EN