Corporate governance in central state-owned enterprises: two decades of institutional evolution and research evidence

Central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs)—a dominant force in China’s national economy—must balance government authority with market mechanisms, while reconciling national interests with firm-level performance. Meanwhile, to ensure competitiveness and efficiency in the market while fulfilling state mandates, it is essential to establish effective incentive mechanisms that motivate managerial effort. Consequently, corporate governance in CSOEs is critical. This paper systematically reviews the institutional evolution and reform practices of CSOEs since the 2003 establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. The analysis focuses on five key dimensions: mergers and acquisitions, board reform, performance evaluation, executive incentives, and auditing and internal control. By synthesizing the literature, this study highlights the theoretical underpinnings of China’s distinctive SOE governance model while providing valuable insights for enterprise reform in other transition economies.