Overrated intuition and underappreciated deliberation: Reevaluating the Smart System-1 account of reasoning

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Authors: Atakan Atamer, Andras Molnar, Priti Shah
Cited by: 1
References: 52

Abstract

The Smart System-1 account of reasoning challenges the classic dual process theory by arguing that accurate responses to many conflict problems, such as the bat and ball problem, are most often the result of "logical intuitions" rather than deliberation. The basis of this claim is that when using a two-response paradigm in which participants first provide an intuitive answer (under cognitive load and time constraints) and then later a deliberative response (no load or time limits), participants who respond accurately typically do so not only in the deliberative phase but also in the initial intuitive phase. Therefore, contrary to what classic dual process theory would suggest, overriding incorrect intuitions through deliberation is not the dominant way of correct answering. Here, we tested the Smart System-1 account after implementing methodological improvements. Experiments 1a and 1b featured a blocked design and a verbal working-memory task to impose effective cognitive load during the intuitive phase, and offered incentives to encourage careful second responses (countering reduced motivation from repeated answering). Experiment 1c replicated the same design without incentives. Experiment 2 included a single trial with an open-ended response format and controlled for reading speed differences. Contrary to past studies supporting the Smart System-1 account, most correct answers were provided only in the deliberate phase across all four experiments, typically after overriding incorrect intuitions. Overall, our results suggest that previous studies substantially underestimated the corrective role of deliberation and overestimated the prevalence of correct intuitions.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Embodied and Extended Cognition Free Will and Agency Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics

Publication details

Journal / source
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Volume
276
Pages
106640–106640
Publication date
9 July 2026
Language
EN