Analysis of bidding strategies and design of value distribution mechanism for multi-type sources in power transaction

• A multi-power source operational model based on the market, bidding, and dispatch layers. • A multi-power source transaction mode based on bid-winning decision-making and fund settlement. • Efficient resource matching and fair value distribution by value distribution mechanism based on the VCG. • Analysis on the influence of group difference factors on the diffusion of power transaction in multiple sources. This paper proposes a novel operational model enabling multi-type energy sources to participate in electricity markets, alongside a value distribution mechanism for flexible resources based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) theory. These contributions address the critical challenges of insufficient flexible regulatory resources and inequitable value allocation among heterogeneous entities, thereby advancing the market-oriented reform of China’s power sector. The proposed three-level operational framework—comprising market, bidding, and dispatch layers—ensures coordinated decision-making, while the two-stage transaction mechanism incorporates social welfare-maximizing clearing and VCG-based settlement that precisely quantifies individual contributions. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach, showing that renewable energy plants require government subsidies when their bidding prices fall below 250 ¥/MWh, and that setting discharge subsidies for storage systems between 0.3–0.5 ¥/kWh fosters synergistic development with renewables. These findings offer valuable investment insights and policy recommendations for stakeholders.