When scarcity intensifies conflict: On the role of asymmetry in common-pool resource games

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Authors: Stephan Geschwind, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Katharina Werner
Cited by: 0
References: 54

Abstract

Conflict over increasingly scarce resources such as freshwater, energy, arable land or wildlife has been identified as a major security threat in a world facing climate change. The literature suggests that asymmetric appropriation of resources facilitates such scarcity-related conflicts. We test this in a novel experimental design based on a dynamic common-pool resource game. In a 2x2 treatment design, we vary Asymmetry/Symmetry and Scarcity/Abundance. We induce Asymmetry by manipulating the perceived availability of the resource. Participants are nudged into high or low appropriations in the first round of the dynamic common-pool resource game. We implement Scarcity as environmental scarcity in the form of low reproduction rates of the renewable resource. Conflict is measured in a second stage of each round in a joy-of-destruction game. We find that environmental scarcity mitigates conflict under Symmetry, but not under Asymmetry. Our findings suggest that a world characterized by increasing scarcity might face exacerbated future conflicts if issues of asymmetric resource use are not properly addressed.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Transboundary Water Resource Management Game Theory and Applications

Publication details

Journal / source
Ecological Economics
Volume
244
Pages
108963–108963
Publication date
16 February 2026
Language
EN