When scarcity intensifies conflict: On the role of asymmetry in common-pool resource games
Abstract
Conflict over increasingly scarce resources such as freshwater, energy, arable land or wildlife has been identified as a major security threat in a world facing climate change. The literature suggests that asymmetric appropriation of resources facilitates such scarcity-related conflicts. We test this in a novel experimental design based on a dynamic common-pool resource game. In a 2x2 treatment design, we vary Asymmetry/Symmetry and Scarcity/Abundance. We induce Asymmetry by manipulating the perceived availability of the resource. Participants are nudged into high or low appropriations in the first round of the dynamic common-pool resource game. We implement Scarcity as environmental scarcity in the form of low reproduction rates of the renewable resource. Conflict is measured in a second stage of each round in a joy-of-destruction game. We find that environmental scarcity mitigates conflict under Symmetry, but not under Asymmetry. Our findings suggest that a world characterized by increasing scarcity might face exacerbated future conflicts if issues of asymmetric resource use are not properly addressed.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Transboundary Water Resource Management
Game Theory and Applications
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Ecological Economics
- Volume
- 244
- Pages
- 108963–108963
- Publication date
- 16 February 2026
- Language
- EN