How to determine key players when spillovers are large
Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of Katz–Bonacich centrality and key-player intercentrality in linear–quadratic network games when spillovers are large. This question is both important and empirically relevant, as it greatly simplifies the empirical testing of peer-effect models. We show that Katz–Bonacich centrality converges (up to scale) to the Perron eigenvector, while intercentrality diverges and loses all discriminatory power across nodes. Consequently, designing key-player policies becomes problematic: key-player rankings collapse, and no agent is more important than another when spillovers are sufficiently large.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Applications
Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Economics Letters
- Volume
- 268
- Pages
- 113210–113210
- Publication date
- 1 September 2026
- Language
- EN