Carbon trading strategies for thermal power enterprises to cope with carbon market illiquidity: Independent pricing vs joint pricing

To address climate change and fulfill its international commitments to reducing carbon emissions, China has accelerated the low-carbon transformation of the thermal power sector through a carbon trading mechanism. However, as the “30·60″ dual-carbon target approaches, the carbon market still faces limited liquidity. This study develops a two-tier Stackelberg decision model that distinguishes advanced from traditional thermal power enterprises and compares optimal strategies, carbon prices, and trading volumes under independent pricing and joint pricing. It further examines how enterprises determine optimal strategies under the principles of self-interest and mutual benefit. The results show that: (1) When market volatility is high, joint decision-making enhances trading volume and market efficiency; when volatility is low, firms act independently and changes in volume mainly reflect risk diversification. (2) A higher carbon price floor stabilizes both prices and incentives, supporting joint pricing, whereas a lower floor weakens price protection, increases volatility, and encourages independent pricing. (3) Traditional enterprises prefer independent pricing to ensure compliance at low prices but adopt joint pricing when cooperative arrangements yield mutual benefits at higher prices. (4) For advanced enterprises, under the self-interest principle, independent pricing prevails when cooperation returns are low, while joint pricing becomes optimal when returns are high. Under the win–win principle, firms adopt independent pricing when cooperative benefits cannot offset concessions, but choose joint pricing when such cooperation ensures mutual gains.