Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences
Abstract
Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The main findings of the experiment are corroborated by a vignette study on the acceptability of kidney sales. The results point to policies that can mitigate repugnance.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Management and Organizational Studies
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Volume
- 157
- Pages
- 22–33
- Publication date
- 13 January 2026
- Language
- EN