Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
Abstract
We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, M-winning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compared to their M-winning counterparts. The analysis extends to the full preference domain. Since M-winning coalition rules are closely related to strong and proper simple games, the analysis is relevant to this strand of the game-theoretic literature as well.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Optimization and Search Problems
Distributed systems and fault tolerance
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Volume
- 157
- Pages
- 263–285
- Publication date
- 14 February 2026
- Language
- EN