Do analysts and long-term institutional investors influence a firm's distress risks?

Read full text
Authors: WeiWei Li, Prasad Padmanabhan, Chia‐Hsing Huang
Cited by: 0
References: 128

Abstract

This paper examines whether and how coverage by analysts influence financial distress risks among firms. Results using Chinese A-share firms’ data over the 2007–2022 period suggest that broader analyst coverage can reduce distress risks. These findings remain robust across multiple sensitivity tests. Moreover, long-term institutional investors, in conjunction with analysts, can further reduce financial distress risks. Mechanism analysis reveals that analyst coverage helps to curb distress risks primarily by enhancing information transparency and strengthening external oversight. Additional heterogeneity tests show that these effects are particularly important for firms facing weaker audit environments and those without established banking relationships. Analyst coverage also serves to inform external stakeholders on a firm’s financial situation (the spotlight effect) and provides value by increasing information flow and strengthening governance mechanisms. Results also show that star analysts and not non-star analysts, reduce distress risks. Finally, analyst coverage also appears to enhance firm value by mitigating distress risks. Overall, study results indicate that analyst coverage and long-term institutional investors can reduce distress risks.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Auditing Earnings Management Governance Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction Corporate Finance and Governance

Publication details

Journal / source
International Review of Economics & Finance
Volume
106
Pages
104892–104892
Publication date
3 January 2026
Language
EN