Governing innovation: The role of D&O insurance in curbing R&D opportunism

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Authors: Chujun Zhang, Wen‐Ju Liao, Zhexin Xie
Cited by: 0
References: 51

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Abstract

This study investigates the impact of Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance on Research and Development (R&D) manipulation among Chinese listed companies. Using a sample of 27,569 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2022, we find that D&O insurance significantly reduces R&D manipulation, especially in non-state-owned firms, under strong external supervision, and during the growth and maturity stages. Further analysis reveals a talent attraction mechanism: D&O coverage increases the proportion of executives with overseas experience, which helps curb opportunistic behavior. We also show that D&O insurance weakens the negative impact of R&D manipulation on future innovation. These findings highlight the governance and strategic value of D&O insurance.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Auditing Earnings Management Governance Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Publication details

Journal / source
International Review of Economics & Finance
Volume
107
Pages
105136–105136
Publication date
21 March 2026
Language
EN