Climate club in China
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This paper examines the conditions under which a subnational Climate Club is stable and welfare-enhancing. We analyze a Climate Club among Chinese provinces using a hybrid-cooperative game framework in which regions simultaneously decide whether to join the club and set their abatement levels. We show that equilibrium requires member compliance and non-member sanctions, with total welfare decreasing in economic flow fee rates for a given club size and jumping upwards when higher flow fee rates enlarge the club size. We further identify the optimal strategy of carbon prices and economic flow fees rates that generate net positive total welfare for participating members. Our framework is then extended to investigate the effects of health vulnerability, historical emissions, and trade protection on club membership, emissions and total welfare. We find that incorporating health vulnerability strengthens economic and environmental gains. Conversely, accounting for historical emissions and trade protection weakens these effects by diminishing incentives for participation and abatement. Finally, we examine the club participation player-level decision process provide concrete policy recommendations. Overall, the Climate Club can serve as an effective complementary policy instrument for carbon mitigation, yielding substantial social welfare improvements if club constraints are judiciously selected.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Climate Change Policy and Economics
Energy
Environment
Economic Growth
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Publication details
- Journal / source
- International Review of Economics & Finance
- Volume
- 108
- Pages
- 105166–105166
- Publication date
- 28 March 2026
- Language
- EN