Covert learning and disclosure
Abstract
I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender’s ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably worsening the meaning of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties to characterize the sense in which the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable , showing that this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I identify sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Media Influence and Politics
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Game Theory and Applications
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Volume
- 235
- Pages
- 106179–106179
- Publication date
- 16 April 2026
- Language
- EN