Flying below the radar: Insider trading by executives below the top
Abstract
To enforce insider trading laws, financial regulators require top executives to make their own-company trades public. One implication of this regulatory focus is that executives below the top fly under the radar. We use administrative register data from Norway to examine whether executives below the top in listed companies earn abnormal returns on purchases in own-company stock. We find evidence of abnormal returns on such trades, about 50 to 100 basis points at the 1-month horizon. The abnormal returns on purchases in other stocks are negative, making high investor ability an unlikely explanation.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Corporate Finance and Governance
Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
Auditing
Earnings Management
Governance
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Volume
- 181
- Pages
- 104282–104282
- Publication date
- 18 April 2026
- Language
- EN