The Walker–Groves–Ledyard mechanism: Improving individual rationality without sacrificing simplicity or stability
Abstract
It is known that no public goods mechanism can be Pareto efficient in Nash equilibrium, individually rational (IR), simple (using a one-dimensional message space), and dynamically stable. The Walker mechanism satisfies all but stability, while the Groves-Ledyard mechanism satisfies all but IR. Here we show that a hybrid between these two mechanisms maintains all of the properties of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, but with fewer IR failures in expectation.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Game Theory and Applications
Economic theories and models
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Volume
- 124
- Pages
- 103225–103225
- Publication date
- 27 February 2026
- Language
- EN