A systems-level case study of the Jeju Air Flight 2216 crash

Jeju Air Flight 2216 crashed at Muan International Airport on December 29, 2024, after a bird strike, killing 179 of 181 aboard making it the deadliest bird strike accident in aviation history. According to the ARAIB interim findings briefed in July 2025, the crew reportedly shut down the undamaged left engine instead of the damaged right one by mistake according to media reports citing interim investigation findings, causing potential loss of thrust and electrical power and leading to the disabling of the landing gear and black boxes. The aircraft overran the runway at high speed and struck a non-frangible concrete ILS structure. We applied HFACS, AcciMap, STAMP-CAST, and Fault Tree Analysis to move beyond the pilot error versus infrastructure debate. HFACS classified the engine shutdown as a stress-induced decision and skill-based error enabled by inadequate emergency training. AcciMap traced how regulatory failures allowed a concrete structure within 264 m of the runway end despite ICAO frangibility requirements. STAMP-CAST identified control structure breakdowns: bird strike warnings issued but no active dispersal, and single-point-of-failure engine controls without cross-verification procedures. FTA importance measures ranked high touchdown speed (probability = 0.0227) as the dominant contributor. Comparison with Air France 358 (Toronto, 2005)-a 300-meter overrun with zero fatalities-demonstrates that the rigid obstacle, not the overrun distance, caused the deaths. Had Muan used frangible ILS mounts like Gimpo and Incheon airports, the outcome would likely have differed. Our multi-framework approach shows the accident resulted from intersecting failures: a recoverable emergency became fatal when human error met inadequate infrastructure.