The tragedy of ill-informed leadership: An experimental study
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This paper investigates the tragedy of ill-informed leadership in a setting where both leaders and followers lack certainty about the returns from a public good. In this context, leaders may unknowingly drive followers to form incorrect beliefs about the state of the world, ultimately leading them to make decisions that are to their disadvantage. Using a laboratory experiment, we show that leaders need not hold perfect information about the state of the world to be influential. When leaders are ill-informed, this influence takes a tragic turn, as leaders who (rationally) follow their information end up misleading followers and generating substantial welfare losses. Specifically, having a misleading leader is associated with a reduction in gains from contributions approximately twice as large as the reduction from halving the return from the public good. Our results underscore the significance of having well-informed leaders.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Game Theory and Applications
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Volume
- 122
- Pages
- 102539–102539
- Publication date
- 28 March 2026
- Language
- EN