Performance Legitimacy
Abstract
Early imperial officials, while enforcing the law, were paradoxically its victims too. They were keenly aware of the stark and ironic contrast between the theoretical design of the legal system and its practical enactment. The law’s meticulous statutes were designed to guide people on what to avoid, yet this led to an over-complication of the law such that commoners did not know what to avoid. The high performance mandated by the law to prevent negligence and laxity ironically ended up punishing those who were earnestly committed to their duties. The principle of assessing results according to predefined objectives was meant to hold officials accountable, but it ultimately stripped them of discretionary power and overlooked their intentions and efforts. Fearing the repercussions of absolute liability, officials might collectively resort to deceit. Furthermore, while severe punishments were intended to eliminate the need for future punishment and establish a crime-free utopia, they criminalized a vast swath of officials and commoners alike. Reforms aimed at simplifying the law were initiated by two different emperors, yet both seem to have failed.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Public Policy and Administration Research
Management and Organizational Studies
Accounting and Organizational Management
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Pages
- 149–166
- Publication date
- 9 January 2026
- Document type
- Book chapter