Buddhist Theory of Concepts

The focus of this chapter is Dharmakīrti’s defence of the Buddhist theory of concepts against the Hindu realists. By way of background, I begin by summarizing the original motivation and account of concepts as exclusions ( apoha ) as it was first adumbrated by the Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga and the criticisms raised against it by the realist Hindu philosophers Uddyotakara and Kumārila. In response to these objections, Dharmakīrti proposes a novel psychological-epistemological account of concept formation. With some help from Kant’s notion of schematism, I argue that Dharmakīrti’s account is successful in responding to the objections raised by the Hindu realists. I then argue that it is innovative in two respects: first, Dharmakīrti introduces the notion of functional similarities to draw attention away from real similarities; and second, his appeal to the notion of ekapratyavamarśa avoids the circularity problem faced by Dignāga’s account.