The Leibnizean Alternative

Cambridge University Press eBooks 2026 Book chapter

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Authors: Graciela T. De Pierris
DOI: 10.1017/9781009273831.012
Cited by: 0
References: 2

Abstract

I draw a contrast between what I call a ‘presentational-phenomenological model of apprehension and ultimate evidence’ – which I attribute to Descartes, Locke and Hume – and Leibniz’s ‘logical-conceptual model of apprehension and ultimate evidence’. Although there are different uses of the word ‘concept’, Leibniz’s model, in my view, illustrates the strictest and best notion of the concept of concepts: one that centrally relies on logic .

Fields of Study & Subjects

Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Publication details

Journal / source
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Pages
229–247
Publication date
30 January 2026
Document type
Book chapter