Kant on the Epigenesis of (Empirical) Concepts

Kant states that empirical concepts, unlike pure concepts, are drawn from experience. Commentators are divided on whether this commits him to empiricism. I develop a rationalist reading that ascribes to Kant an epigenetic account of empirical concepts. To pave the way for this account, I first discuss Leibniz’s innatist alternative and then examine the parallel between Kant’s arguments about the origin of categories (pure concepts) and about biological formations. In both arguments, Kant defends a model of epigenesis that postulates an innate ‘preformation’ (in the form of ‘germs’ and predispositions) in the relevant cognitive faculty or organic species, while leaving room for external material conditions to play an indispensable role. The same model, I argue, can be extended to the formation of empirical concepts. I then connect this Kantian model with recent literature in cognitive science on the ‘epigenesis of mind’ and with the ongoing controversy over concept empiricism.