Two Concepts of Concept in Early Analytic Philosophy
Abstract
Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) and Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) stand at the beginning of the development of analytic philosophy. Both philosophers offer accounts of concepts that take them to be abstract objects, and for both of them concepts play an important theoretical role. However, while Bolzano worked out the Kantian view of concepts, Frege himself approached concepts from a new angle. In this chapter I first introduce the Bolzanian view of concepts and then discuss how Frege provided a fresh start in the theory of concepts by introducing the notion of incompleteness.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy
Science
and History
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Pages
- 324–343
- Publication date
- 30 January 2026
- Document type
- Book chapter