Introduction

The following book is motivated by two primary questions, each of which is familiar – doubtless all-too familiar – and yet somehow enduringly puzzling. The first is the matter of what Hegel does and does not accept of the core of Kant’s practical philosophy, specifically his theory of freedom. On the one hand, Hegel’s teachings about morality, right and ethics are unthinkable without those of his predecessor. To remove any doubts about this, one need only take a look at the opening paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right , 1 which clearly show Hegel attempting to appropriate the crux of Kant’s notion of autonomy – while studiously avoiding that term, to be sure – in his own distinctive fashion. In these passages, freedom is presented as the essence of the will, with the consequence, we are supposedly shown, that the will is normatively constrained to will a specific content, namely its own freedom.