Theodicies

This chapter begins by setting out various axes along which to categorise different kinds of theodicy. In particular, it is useful to distinguish between the kind of puzzle to which a theodicy responds and the kind of solution it proposes; between theodicies with theoretical and theodicies with existential motivations; and between theodicies that offer defences of religious doctrines and theodicies that endeavour to explain how those doctrines should be understood. With this framework in place, the chapter outlines certain central traits of the theodicy tradition prior to Leibniz, in order to bring out the historical peculiarity and radicality of Leibniz’s own enterprise. A brief look at the example of Augustine allows us to make two further crucial distinctions: between the project of explaining how God can be causally implicated in evil and that of addressing the apparent inadequacy of creation; and between theodicies that begin with fixed axiological criteria and those that think the nature of goodness must be gradually revealed.