Conclusion

The interpretation of Hegelian theodicy that has emerged over previous chapters finally allows us to understand Hegel’s accusation that Leibnizian theodicy is undermined by its ‘abstract’ and ‘indeterminate’ categories. As Hegel’s fuller discussion of Leibniz’s theodicy shows, the root of the problem is that his theodicy is afflicted by two kinds of ‘arbitrariness’: first, Leibniz’s application of axiological criteria to worldly instances eludes rational comprehension; second, Leibniz simply presupposes those criteria, with the result that the mutual implication of good and evil remains an unexplained given. Hegel’s own theodical enterprise, however, is not without its internal tensions. Following through on the logic of Hegel’s theodicy as geared towards effecting reconciliation means seeing it as effecting a break with the juridical model found in Kant and Leibniz: the goal of justification must be renounced not as unrealisable, but as misconceived. Nevertheless, Hegel’s own presentations of the goal of his philosophy frequently betrays a justificatory ambition that marks a fundamental continuity with his predecessors, seemingly invoking a teleological logic, whereby history can be measured by an absolute end or standard. The ultimate assessment of Hegelian theodicy turns, in large part, on whether this should be understood as rhetoric or rationale.