Impulse, Sublimation, and Scientific Morality

: In this chapter, Herbert explores John Dewey’s concept of impulse in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), highlighting its oft-neglected role in his theory of agency. Dewey presents impulse as a spontaneous and creative force essential for breaking rigid habits and fostering intelligent inquiry. Unlike moral theories that treat impulse as something to suppress, he sees it as crucial to moral growth and adaptation. Dewey’s naturalistic framework situates impulse within a dynamic interplay with habit and intelligence. While habit provides stability, impulse introduces novelty, enabling the reorganization of conduct when patterns fail. This aligns Dewey with Peirce’s view of inquiry as emerging from disrupted expectations and contrasts with Bergson’s élan vital , which lacks Dewey’s empirical grounding. Dewey also engages implicitly with Freud, critiquing reductionist views of instinct while endorsing the constructive redirection of impulses through sublimation. Dewey envisions ethics as a form of empirical inquiry, treating moral agency as continuous experimentation rather than rule adherence. As Herbert concludes, Dewey critiques traditional moral philosophies for their distrust of impulse, arguing that rigid norms stifle creativity. Instead, Dewey advocates an ethics that integrates impulse, habit, and intelligence into a flexible and adaptive model for human flourishing.