Moral Knowledge and Ordinary Activity in Dewey and Daoism

: In Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Dewey claims there is no specific “organ of moral knowledge” apart from ordinary activity. Such a claim collapses an important distinction in Greek philosophy between “arts” ( technē ) guided by theoretical knowing and mere “knacks” ( empeiria ) that accrue their results by trial and error. By denying that there is a specific “organ of moral knowledge,” it would appear that, for Dewey, morality is nothing but a hit-or-miss process, and such a position has exposed Dewey to criticisms over the years. This chapter will explore such concerns through engagement with the Daoist tradition. The focus will be on the Zhuangzi , a text that is replete with stories about craftspeople gaining insight and developing efficacy by engaging in ordinary activity without reliance on theoretical knowing. Such stories, commonly known as “knack passages,” are meant to be prescriptive; they tell us how to live. As such, they have occasioned critiques similar to those that Dewey received. Here, it will be argued that the Daoist tradition, while not providing “moral direction” as conventionally understood, is not without its own virtues. Similar virtues, in fact, are outlined in Dewey’s own philosophy, and these might mitigate the concerns of his critics.