A Hedge on Détente, a Risk After War, and a Bargain in Asymmetric Competition

To demonstrate the generalizability of the theory beyond US–Soviet nuclear arms control, Chapter 5 examines three cases: the 1999 Lahore Declaration between India and Pakistan, the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, and negotiations between the United States and Iran in 2009–2015. The India–Pakistan case reveals how political shifts can motivate states to hedge previously informal cooperation with low monitoring agreements. The Egypt–Israel and US–Iran cases demonstrate how uncertainty following leadership transitions and public demonstrations can lead highly adversarial states to take a risk on cooperation, but using agreements with intrusive verification measures. While other factors, including third-party mediation, relative power, and crises, also contributed to these outcomes, the evidence indicates that domestic political volatility had distinct effects on agreement timing and design. The findings challenge alternative explanations based on incremental trust-building and socialization. As the cases span different regions, time periods, and types of military competition, they validate the broader applicability of the book’s theoretical framework linking domestic political volatility and uncertainty to arms control agreement design.