Attacking the Viet Cong Infrastructure (or How to take a well-defined order and an effective operation plan and successfully botch both miserably)

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Authors: Glenn Wahlert
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Abstract

There were two fundamental problems that the commander of 1ATF, Brigadier Oliver Jackson, had to deal with when the task force was established at Nui Dat. The first was the presence of main force enemy in Phuoc Tuy province. The second was the VCI: ‘the extortionists, the terrorists, the standover men, [and] the tax men’. This infrastructure provided a shadow government and support network for the North Vietnamese military and VC local forces in the south. Most villages and towns had representatives of this network – men, women, and children – who provided a recruitment base for the VC, an intelligence network, a supply service and various other forms of support. The VCI enabled the enemy to conduct operations in the south. While it was the National Police, ARVN and associated paramilitary forces that were responsible for its destruction, this proved to be beyond the capability of the Saigon government.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Military History and Strategy Vietnamese History and Culture Studies Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan Pakistan and Middle East

Publication details

Journal / source
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Pages
158–177
Publication date
3 February 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter