The Concept’s Comprehension of the Metaphysics of Substance

This chapter concerns the relation of the Concept Logic to the prior main division of the Logic , the Objective Logic. Hegel’s goal in the Objective Logic is not to develop a theory of the entities it discusses. Instead, Hegel’s work should be read as employing a device here called suspended reference , a way of using a concept without being committed to the reality of its referent. Since Hegel does not offer a metaphysical theory in the Objective Logic, that book can be primarily critical in function. It is then argued that the Concept Logic aims to demonstrate the grounds of the metaphysical concepts of the Objective Logic. It does so by showing that each of them are based in the mere form of thought, especially in judgment and syllogism. This makes Hegel’s conception of metaphysics non-theoretical in the sense that its objects are not separable from the thought that thinks them.