Intergovernmentalism on the Rise: The Council in the Battle over the Constitutional Practice of European Law

This chapter examines the rise of intergovernmentalism in the European Communities and its impact on the development of a constitutional practice of European law. While a constitutional interpretation of European law was developed by an alliance of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, the increasing saliency of intergovernmental decision-making – above all else, the strengthened role of national governments in the Council - was an equally critical and possibly more influential pillar of European integration, which effectively constrained supranational governance. Pivotal moments include the Empty Chair Crisis (1965–66) and the Luxembourg Compromise (1966). The development of the member state veto and the suppression of majority voting were powerful instances of member states asserting their control over the course of European integration. The chapter concludes that intergovernmental governance, while never coherent or unanimous enough to outright curtail the Court’s doctrines, significantly shaped the trajectory of European legal integration.