Non-cooperative Games

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Authors: Akira Okada
Cited by: 0

Abstract

An n-person game in strategic form is defined by a triplet G = ( N , { A i } i∈N , { u i } i∈N ) with the following elements. N = {1 ,...,n } is a set of players where n ≥ 2. Each A i (i ∈ N ) is a finite set of pure strategies (or actions ) for player i . The Cartesian product A = Π i ∈ N A i is the set of pure strategy profiles a = ( a 1 ,...,a n ). The real-valued function u i on A is a payoff function of player i . A game in strategic form is abbreviated as a strategic game. In what follows, we denote by Δ( X ) the set of probability distributions on a finite set X .

Fields of Study & Subjects

Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Publication details

Journal / source
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Pages
31–45
Publication date
14 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter