n-Person Pure Bargaining Games
Abstract
This section presents non-cooperative bargaining models for n -person pure bargaining games in Section 3.1. Initiated by the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982), the bargaining models have a sequential structure in which some player proposes a payoff allocation, and all other players sequentially respond to it. Bargaining continues until an agreement is made. A rule that selects a proposer is called a bargaining protocol. The relationship between non-cooperative equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution is considered.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Game Theory and Applications
Conflict Management and Negotiation
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Pages
- 69–87
- Publication date
- 14 March 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter