Cost–Benefit Decision-Making and Lone-Actor Terrorism
Abstract
The primary conceptual underpinning of understanding offender decision making is that they are rational actors. This chapter applies rational-choice approaches that are used to understand everyday criminals to the problem of lone-actor terrorism. The first section poses the question: who are the lone actor terrorists? It is established that they are a broad set of individuals; no profile exists, and they are varied in terms traits and pathways into terrorism. The second section discusses the rationality of lone actor terrorists in terms of the decision-making processes surrounding choosing a target and hostile reconnaissance. Decisions about when, where, and how to carry out a particular attack derive from simple cost-benefit analyses, including anticipated and unexpected costs. The next section discusses how cost-benefit analyses can be used to disrupt lone-actor terrorism through detection and deterrence. The final section consists of several illustrative examples. This is followed by suggestions of basic prevention mechanisms to counter lone-actor terrorism based on the situational qualities of their behaviour.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Terrorism
Counterterrorism
and Political Violence
Crime Patterns and Interventions
Crime
Illicit Activities
and Governance
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Pages
- 352–370
- Publication date
- 8 March 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter