Nicholas Kerr. Electoral Commissions and Democratization in Africa: Everyday Production of Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford University Press, 2024. 366 pp. $136. Hardcover. ISBN: 9780198895367.

In answering the question of why some African countries conduct elections that meet international democratic standards while others fall short, Nicholas Kerr places electoral commissions (ECs) at the center of this puzzle, treating them not as mundane administrative bodies but as key informational institutions.Their autonomy and capacity shape how citizens and elites form expectations about elections, influencing turnout, participation, losers' consent, and overall legitimacy.By highlighting the informational role of electoral commissions, Kerr explains variation in election quality and legitimacy across African democracies, drawing on survey data and fieldwork and using the Nigerian case to test the argument that electoral commissions matter deeply for democratization in Africa.The first chapter of the book is a substantial introduction where the author explains that ECs play an informational role in reducing uncertainties that undermine confidence in elections, particularly regarding fraud and administrative irregularities.The second chapter develops the theory in depth: the information role of ECs.Both autonomy and capacity, which constitute the dimensions of EC institutionalization, are said to have both individual and joint effects on the quality and legitimacy of elections.The chapter introduces a typology distinguishing between institutionalized commissions (Ghana and South Africa, post-2000), partially institutionalized commissions (Rwanda, post-2003; Malawi, 1994 Malawi, -2014)), and non-institutionalized commissions (Zimbabwe, post-2005; Nigeria, post-1999).To briefly detail the historical overview of ECs in Africa and Nigeria, the third chapter focuses on their institutional development since the 1990s wave of multipartyism.The author distinguishes between autonomy and capacity, both in law and in practice, and highlights their key subdimensions.Moving to the empirical section, the fourth chapter empirically tests the core argument that EC autonomy and capacity shape the strategic considerations of political elites.Using regression analysis across forty sub-Saharan African countries , the author shows that opposition boycotts are less likely when EC autonomy is high.Similarly, losing candidates and parties are more likely to comply with the results when EC capacity is strong.The findings suggest that autonomy matters more for discouraging opposition boycotts, while capacity is more decisive in fostering losers' consent.To be specific, the fifth chapter investigates the consequences of the EC autonomy and capacity for shaping