Do better managers bribe less? Cross-national and experimental evidence

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Authors: Edmund J Malesky, Tuan Ngoc Phan, Daniel Yi Xu, T. Robert Fetter
Cited by: 0
References: 79

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Abstract

Abstract Work on the relationship between regulation and bribery suggests that bribes are a joint function of the demands of bureaucrats and the supply of business managers willing to pay them. However, due to biases in measurement, empirical work has concentrated on country-level, demand-side drivers, while research on factors that lead businesses to bribe remains theoretically rich but empirically underdeveloped. We contribute to the burgeoning work on the supply of bribery with a formal model that predicts poorly managed firms may strategically initiate bribes because resource constraints and/or poor service quality necessitate shortcuts in regulatory compliance. To test these theories, we present two connected studies. The first demonstrates that the predictions are consistent with cross-national business survey data. The second, a field experiment, randomly assigned firms to management training courses in Vietnam. Using detailed accounting books, we find that firms in the management course paid monthly bribes less than one-fifth the size ($227 less) of the placebo group, and, consistent with our predictions, had higher levels of regulatory compliance.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Corruption and Economic Development Political Influence and Corporate Strategies Regulation and Compliance Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
Business and Politics
Pages
1–30
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN