Why Obligations can’t be Relational All the Way Down
Abstract
There is a straightforward conceptual distinction between “relational” and “nonrelational” obligations (obligations that are not conceived in explicitly relational terms). 1 Unlike nonrelational obligations, it is intrinsic to relational obligations that they are owed to others. In addition to the person subject to the obligation, the obligor , there is also an obligee (or obligees) to whom the obligation is owed. With nonrelational obligations, there need only be an obligor; no obligee is required. Similarly, when a nonrelational obligation is violated, something wrong has been done. When, however, the violated obligation is relational, not only is a ( pro tanto ) wrong done, someone to whom the obligation is owed is wronged.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Free Will and Agency
Legal principles and applications
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Pages
- 1–11
- Publication date
- 7 August 2026
- Language
- EN